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BOOK REVIEWS

Responsibility and Christian Ethics, by William Schweiker. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xiv, 255. $54.95 (cloth).
JANICE DAURIO, Moorpark College
Those who claim that their books do something new are brave indeed, but
the bravery is seldom warranted: It's very hard to do something new.
Even truly new ideas are in some sense just refinements of old ideas, as the
list of footnotes to Plato gets longer. There is more hope of newness in
ethics, where the author can claim that the something new is the application of old ideas to new situations.
William Schweiker's purpose, in Responsibility and Christian Ethics, is to
do something new, specifically, to deploy a new Christian ethics of responsibility. (This book is the sixth in a new series on Christian Ethics, edited
by Robin Gill.) He wants to give "a theory of responsibility which differs
from ... all Christian accounts of responsibility in this century." In the same
place he makes a more modest claim for the book: He wants simply to
"renew the enterprise of Christian moral philosophy" (p. 5, emphasis
added). The renewal is necessary, he says, in light of the increasing pluralism and "the radical extension of human power in the contemporary
world" (p. 24).
This is what he wants to do, but what does he actually do? To give the
good news and the bad news all at once: At its best the book suggests an
important change of emphasis to those doing ethics, especially Christian
ethics. But it does little more than suggest; it does not argue for this
emphasis, and the book is not clear. Though Schweiker uses the word
"argue" often enough, what he does is summarize rather than argue for
positions, his own and others. Contributing to the lack of clarity are the
failure to make distinctions, the lack of examples, and the superficial dismissal of arguments for competing points of view.
But let's go through the book first.
Schweiker wants to add a new moral theory to the present number, and
he wants to call it an integrated ethics of responsibility. "Much as one can
speak of virtue ethics, natural law ethics, or divine command ethics," he
writes, one can speak of an ethics of responsibility (p. 38). The key concepts of his theory of responsibility, he says, are (not surprisingly) responsibility and integrity. The proposed new theory of responsibility will offer
that "basic, irreducible conception which serves as a starting point for the
development of a coherent and comprehensive ethical doctrine," he says,
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quoting Albert R. Jonsen (p. 43). That concept is responsibility. His plan is
to integrate into his theory all the advantages of previous moral theories,
especially all previous theories of responsibility, to add an element all of
them lack, and to avoid all the disadvantages of those other theories. Of
course this is what every moral theorist wants to do, so it is nothing to
write home about. What would have been worth writing home about is
having pulled it off.
Schweiker thinks the right theory must have the following characteristics: (1) a description of the moral life as characterized by lithe dialectical
relation between actualization of self and encounter with others mediated
by social roles and vocations"; (2) a thorough presentation of the relationship between "the goods which persons are to respect"; and (3) an explanation of how it is that the agent's identity is constituted in terms of these
goods (p. 104).
As for the first characteristic, Schweiker thinks that moral theories of
responsibility which are defined in terms of the agent's encounters with
others and their claims on the agent are most on the mark. He catalogs
extant theories of responsibility as agential, social, and dialogical, but he
finds all of these wanting, even the dialogical type he favors. The first
type, the agential, grounds responsibility in the acting agent. The second,
the social, centers on social practices of praise and blame. But these other
theories of responsibility all fail because, according to Schweiker, they "fasten on only one aspect of responsibility" and miss that important element
he calls integrity.
Schweiker's reservations with respect to the ethics of both Kant and
Tillich, which he calls the agential type, have to do with their interiorityin Kant's case, too much on the will, not enough on the world; in Tillich's,
too much on conscience, not enough on "the multidimensionality of life."
What he likes about these theories is the emphasis on respect (Kant's) and
integrity (Tillich's).
He calls the theories of responsibility of F. H. Bradley, Peter French, and
Marion Smiley the social type. He discusses with approval Smiley's and
French's broadening of the concept of agent responsibility to include
actions they do not directly cause. Schweiker also approves of the way
these theories define and assign praise and blame in a community context,
and he especially likes that these theories recognize the importance given
to the maintenance of identity within the community .. The shortcoming of
the social type of theory is that it can't account for the authority of social
practices, according to Schweiker.
Representatives of the dialogical type of moral theory, he says, are Karl
Barth, H. Richard Niebuhr, Bernard Haring, and Charles Curran. What
characterizes theories of this type is "a marked social dimension ... with
respect to the demand to respond to others" (94). Schweiker distinguishes
Niebuhr's theory from Barth's by the former's emphasis on responsibility
and the latter's on divine command through Jesus Christ. Theories of this
type address the need to thwart the tendency to self-aggrandizement,
which is good, according to Schweiker. But what's bad is that they put
their money on revelation rather than responsibility: "This shifts moral
reflection from the responsible self to the priority of the [Divine or human]
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other." (p. 102).
Each of these types, Schweiker says, offers a "genuine insight" but none
is "adequate." None of these theories, he thinks, says enough about "the
complexity of life in a late-modern, technological world," because of the
possibilities for power and its abuse in these times.
The old moral theories, including the old theories of responsibility, are
inadequate to this challenge, he says. Those moral theories which address
the use of power at all do so only by offering some modest limits on its use
when a more comprehensive and aggressive approach is called for.
Traditional Christian ethical theories merely "specify norms for the exercise [of power] so that one could determine when coercive action was justified" (p. 45). Schweiker thinks that the traditional theory of a just war, for
example, falls short of an adequate treatment of power.
What all these theories need to do is consider power aggressively and
proactively, with norms for the control of power as the centerpiece. "The
core of Christian faith is about the radical transvaluation of power in order
to respect and enhance the integrity of finite life" (p. 216). What they all
need to do is take responsibility for the right use of power seriously.
Responsibility comes with voluntary action, and voluntary action means
freedom from compulsion. Responsibility is not dependent on particular
social practices of praise and blame.
Second, Schweiker thinks that the moral theorist has to get the relationship between goods right. Schweiker proffers three kinds of human goods:
premoral, social, and reflective. Over all these, the agent is to put on
integrity, which binds the rest together. Integrity, in other words, is the
ethical good, he says, though "the moral domain of life is constituted by
interlocking goods."(p. 118). By "integrity" he means "the abiding commitment to a specific moral project as well as the attitudes and dispositions
this commitment entails" (p. 32). Schweiker wants to preserve and amplify
the insights of those contemporary philosophers who realize the value of
integrity (like Bernard Williams) and the value of responsibility (like Peter
French).
Third, Schweiker explains how the agent's identity is constituted in
terms of these goods by introducing two new terms, "hermeneutical realism" and "the act of radical interpretation." To explain these, Schweiker
tries to clear some ground between moral "realism" and "anti-realism"
and to plant his theory there. Roughly, by realism he means the view that
moral norms are discovered, and by anti-realism that they are invented.
On the one hand, he says that moral values are real in that they depend not
upon their acceptance by either the individual moral agent or her community, but rather on "the reality and/ or will of God" (p. 110). On the other
hand, he says that he agrees with J. L. Mackie in insisting that "values are
not part of the fabric of the world" (pp. 107, 109). So what's a Christian
ethicist to do?
The trick, according to Schweiker, is to see that the conception (of moral
norms and values) depends on the perception (of the world). The
Christian perceives the world in a certain way, and his perception of the
world requires adherence to certain moral norms which come with the perception. Integrity is the virtue of one's abiding commitment to that certain
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perception of the world which is distinctly Christian. Moral values are
real, then, in the sense that they are dictated by the Christian's interpretation of the world-hence what Schweiker calls "hermeneutical realism."
Hermeneutical realism is the interpretation the agent gives to a situation with potential moral relevance, and this interpretation constitutes
that situation's moral value, and the agent is guided in that interpretation by the social, natural, historical and biological conditions in which
she finds herself (p. 113). Nonetheless, Schweiker says, "valid moral
norms, accounts of moral situations, and decisions about what to do are
not reducible to the subjective understanding of an agent" or a community (p. 40). I suppose what he means is that the agent cannot be guided
by mere whim or preference but is restricted by the conditions mentioned above, and the community is restricted by its adherence to a
Christian perception of the world.
This interpretation is radical because the moral norms the agent
chooses and the ways she accounts for moral situations determine who
she is. She accomplishes who she is in what Schweiker calls "the act of
radical interpretation," that is, the ways in which "we determine the
desires and volitions we want to characterize our lives" (p. 39).
It's (barely?) possible that a Christian ethics would not offer a distinctive course for action, but it is not at all possible that a distinctively
Christian ethics would fail to offer a uniquely Christian way of thinking
about the moral life. Here's how Schweiker intends that his theory be
distinctively Christian: It defines responsibility as being accountable to
others and obedient to God. Indeed, this putatively new imperative of
responsibility specifies that "in all actions and relations we are to respect
and enhance the integrity of life before God" (p. 38).
The individual agent rather than the community is the primary locus
of responsibility, but responsibility is deployed in the individual's dealings in the world and with others. By the way, Schweiker thinks that it
is possible to call institutions moral agents, as long as "the institution
represents its identity through interpretive practices (reports to shareholders, accounting practices, political traditions, social histories, communal memory) and constitutes itself through time." (p. 184).
The book's contribution is this: It draws the reader's attention to the
dangerous escalation of power in the modern world, with its attendant
new possibilities for misuse and abuse. Schweiker thinks that the possibilities for power have increased exponentially and that this fact alone
cries out for a new ethical theory. He's probably right.
But Schweiker does not always explain his terms. He does not tell us
enough, for example, about what he means by being obedient to God or
what he means by integrity of life before God. For another example, I
don't know what he means by calling the goods which are supposed to
dominate the moral life "interlocking." But hedging his bets is what
characterizes Schweiker's approach in this book, so what I think he
means is that in one way he wants there to be just one moral good, but
in another way he wants there to be several goods. Now this way of
claiming both sides of the issue is not tout court an inconsistency. But an
author who is trying to marry previously conflicting claims must be
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clear about the distinctions he is making and Schweiker isn't.
Here's another example: He says that the "interlocking" goods, like
sexual fulfillment, bodily comfort, food and shelter, and "profound
music" are premoral and so "in certain circumstances it is permissible to
violate ... these values while it is much more difficult, perhaps impossible,
to justify acting directly against a [which?] moral value" (118). As I read
this claim, Schweiker is saying that one may violate some value without
acting directly against that value. But what does that mean? What does
it mean to violate a value without acting directly against that value? It
may be that there is a difference, but Schweiker does not seem to notice
that there is a need to explain what the difference is.
And the reader has probably already noticed that on the one hand
Schweiker rejects dialogical theories because they make revelation central, but on the other hand, he wants the conception of moral values to
be dictated by a Christian perception of the world. If it is revelation
which gives this Christian perception of the world-and where else
would it come from?-we've got another inconsistency.
While in some places Schweiker does not seem to notice that he has a
problem when he has one, in other places he thinks he has a problem
when he does not. For example, when he blames dialogical theories of
responsibility for shifting moral reflection from the self to the other, I
think he has fallen victim to a false dilemma. I don't know why a moral
theory cannot include "moral reflection" on self and other.
Another problem is the cavalier dismissal of the complexity of some
conceptual problems. Here is an example: He says that "there simply is
no evidence that reality, nature, or God can be held morally accountable
in the same way that human agents can" (p. 13, emphasis added). I
don't know what it would mean to hold reality or nature morally
accountable, but there are certainly good arguments (and therefore some
evidence) for calling God a moral agent.
There are different ways to make a contribution to ethics (or indeed
any field), but perhaps they all amount to two kinds: Either 0) one contributes to a dialog already in process, or (2) one stands back from the
present dialog, takes stock of the big picture, and points the direction the
dialog ought to go from here. William Schweiker does do the latter.
As for the inconsistencies, maybe keeping the best features of conflicting moral theories is impossible, not just for Schweiker but for anybody.
Maybe doing moral philosophy itself is eternally frustrating: The theorist sees clearly the claims entailed by his position, but also sees clearly
the value of what he has had to let go of in order to have a coherent
moral theory. Maybe the prolonged effort of the human intellect to
frame a satisfying moral theory is (as Sidgwick put it) "foredoomed to
inevitable failure." Maybe the theories Schweiker wants to synchronize
cannot be synchronized. But it is certainly worth a try, and someone (or
several) should try it. Moral philosophers, both Christian and secular,
then, can learn from Schweiker.

